




Th e ex-SFRY states have been under the incre-
ased pressure of illegal migrants since 2009, i.e. 
the onset of the second migration wave from the 
territory of the Republic of Greece. Th e largest per-
centage of the refugees and migrants represent the 
citizens of the Afro-Asian countries that use the 
Western Balkans as a transit route to the Europe-
an Union. An important factor that increased the 
“attractiveness” of the Republic of Serbia for mi-
grants is the incorporation of Hungary within the 
Schengen agreement framework, which makes the 
Serbian-Hungarian border the last obstacle towar-
ds the rich countries of the West. Th e main routes 
from which irregular migrants come to Serbia lead 
from Greece and Macedonia, where by using vario-
us modes of illegal crossing of state borders (on foot, 
between two offi  cial border crossings, hiding in car-
go departments of vehicles and trains, avoiding the 
border control, using fake documents etc.) refugees 
and migrants enter the territory of the Republic of 
Serbia, aft er which they, again, try to illegally leave 
the country. Since 2013, another route – from Bul-
garia - was activated [1].
In addition, the volunteers from the wars in Syria 
and Iraq represent a signifi cant security problem [2]. 
Namely, from 2013 until March 2016 the returnees 
have been protagonists in seventeen terrorist attacks 
or unsuccessful plots in Europe. Two of those events 
were recorded at the territory of Kosovo* [3].
Th e particularity of Serbia in comparison with 
the other “Balkan Route” countries is that migrants 
pass through the areas in which the activities of the 
radical and extremist Islamist groups have been re-
corded – i.e. the region of Sandžak/Raška and the 
southern municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac. 
Moreover, on that territory several camps for mi-
grants and asylum seekers were set up - in the towns 
of Preševo, Bujanovac, Sjenica and Tutin. Th is fact 
points to the potential of the contacts between local 
extremists and the returnees from the war in Syria 
with the migrants, and with the “fake migrants”, i.e. 
the ISIL (DAESH, IDIL) and Al-Qaeda members 
and associates.    
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In the fi rst part of the paper, we will present 
the main security implications of the “migrant 
wave“ that hit the Balkan Peninsula in 2014, as 
well as some terminological doubts about the use 
of the terms ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’. 
In the second part, the process of radicalization, 
the presence of the radical groups in Serbia, the 
recruitment for the war in Syria and Iraq, as well as 
the framing of returnees as a security problem will 
be discussed. Finally, the authors will assess the 
possibility of the contacts between refugees and 
migrants accommodated in the camps and the re-
turnees and local extremists, security implications 
of that scenario and the risk reduction measures.
2.  MIGRANTS OR REFUGEES? – 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS  
Th ere is an ongoing debate how to call the pe-
ople who move into Europe due to the wars and 
crises in the Middle East, Near East and North 
Africa. According to a Council of Foreign Re-
lations report, Europe is currently witnessing a 
mixed-migration phenomenon, in which econo-
mic migrants and asylum seekers travel together 
and these groups overlap. Th is phenomenon is 
further exacerbated by the inconsistent methods 
with which asylum applications are oft en proce-
ssed across the EU [4].
Under the UN Refugee Convention on the 
Status of Refugees from 1951, an asylum seeker is 
a person fl eeing persecution or confl ict, and the-
refore seeking international protection. Strictly 
speaking, a refugee is an asylum seeker whose 
claim has been approved. However, the same 
convention defi nes a refugee as any person who 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it” [5]. Th erefore, in 
the eyes of the UN Syrian nationals enjoy prima 
facie refugee status. According to the Guardian re-
port around 50% of all refugees come from Syria, 
13% from Afghanistan, 8% from Eritrea, 4% from 
Nigeria, 3% from Somalia, Pakistan and Iraq, and 
2% from Sudan. Refugee crisis: apart from Syrians, 
who else is travelling to Europe? Th ey are so reco-
gnized as it is too dangerous for them to return to 
their own country, and for them denial of asylum 
has potentially deadly consequences [5].
An economic migrant is, on the contrary, a 
person whose primary motivation for leaving is 
economic gain. Lately, the term ‘migrant’ is seen as 
an umbrella term for all three groups [4], although 
according to the UNHCR this is not justifi able [6].
According to the UNHCR “So, at UNHCR we 
say ‘refugees and migrants’ when referring to mo-
vements of people by sea or in other circumstan-
ces where we think both groups may be present 
– boat movements in Southeast Asia are another 
example. We say ‘refugees’ when we mean people 
fl eeing war or persecution across an international 
border. And we say ‘migrants’ when we mean pe-
ople moving for reasons not included in the legal 
defi nition of a refugee” [6].
Th is is not just a linguistic question, as accor-
ding to the international law, refugees and mi-
grants can be treated diff erently. Namely, countri-
es are free to deport migrants who arrive without 
legal papers, which they cannot do with refugees 
under the 1951 UN Convention [7]. Th erefore, for 
many EU politicians there is an incentive to qua-
lify everyone fl eeing to Europe as migrants instead 
of refugees.
Uncontrolled migrations may have serious se-
curity repercussions. Politicians can articulate and 
securitize them in such a manner that certain gro-
ups within the general public will start considering 
them to be a fundamental threat to the political, 
societal, economic and cultural security.   
Politicians can articulate illegal migration as 
a threat to the political, societal, economic and 
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cultural security of the state and society, with the 
acceptance of certain parts of the general public. It 
is believed that illegal migrations impair the secu-
rity of state borders and thus represent a threat to 
the national sovereignty of a state (political secu-
rity). Also, they can exert negative infl uence over 
the structure of society and its economic well-
being by impacting the social order and causing 
increased political turmoil and a higher criminal 
rate (social security). In addition, refugees and mi-
grants have oft en been portrayed as a threat to the 
lifestyle and culture of the receiving country. Apart 
from getting the blame for soaring crime rates and 
other social problems, illegal migrants are occasi-
onally represented as economic migrants seeking 
the asylum in order to abuse the social security 
system of a state, or to take jobs from the local po-
pulation (economic security). Finally, the arrival 
of ethnically or religiously homogenous migrants 
may be regarded as a cause of change in the racial/
ethnical/religious structure of the state and society 
and the weakening of its cultural identity. Th ere-
fore, through the process of securitization, illegal 
migrations may be separately or cumulatively ar-
ticulated as a fundamental threat to the referent 
object (the state, society or an individual), either 
separately or as a part of a group [8].
Among the most prominent risks is the possi-
bility of infi ltration of terrorists as bogus migrants 
and their connection with local extremists along 
the migrant routes. Connected with this is the risk 
of radicalization of the population in the countries 
that are the fi nal destinations of migrants, as well 
as in those through which they pass on their way. 
In a personal interview we conducted with 
a Serbian security expert he stated that there are 
substantiated suspicions that the Islamic State is 
exploiting the tidal wave of migrants into Euro-
pe in order to bolster its ranks. Furthermore, it is 
documented that radical Islamist entities affi  liated 
with Al-Qaeda and ISIS are behind some smu-
gglers’ networks with ‘headquarters’ in Libya and 
Syria, where large areas are controlled by the extre-
mists. It is diffi  cult to estimate the number of un-
dercover terrorists among the migrants, and alt-
hough there are some estimates that the number 
could actually be rather high, this still has not been 
corroborated by any trustworthy publicly available 
source. (Personal interview, 25th February 2016) 
On the other hand, there is a hypothesis that the 
jihadists use the migrant crisis for fearmongering, 
whilst the number of infi ltrated terrorists is negli-
gible. It should be stressed that fear is a concept 
that represents the very core of terrorism. 
3.  WAHHABISM AND VOLUNTEERING 
IN THE WAR IN SYRIA  
Probably the most complete defi nition of ra-
dicalization is given by Alex Schmid: „ Radicaliza-
tion is an individual or collective (group) process 
whereby, usually in a situation of political polari-
sation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise 
and tolerance between political actors and groups 
with diverging interests are abandoned by one or 
both sides in a confl ict dyad in favour of a growing 
commitment to engage in confrontational tactics 
of confl ict-waging. Th ese can include either (i) the 
use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) va-
rious forms of political violence other than terro-
rism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form 
of terrorism and war crimes. Th e process is, on the 
side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an 
ideological socialization away from mainstream or 
status quo-oriented positions towards more radical 
or extremist positions involving a dichotomous 
world view and the acceptance of an alternative 
focal point of political mobilization outside the do-
minant political order as the existing system is no 
longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate “[9].
For the RAND corporation, Islamist radicali-
zation comprehends the acceptance of belief that, 
for the purpose of the re-establishment of the glo-
bal Muslim state – Caliphate, Muslims not only 
have to accept the strict Salafi st (ultraconserva-
tive) interpretation of Islam, but also to lead the 
Holy War – Jihad, defi ned as an armed struggle 
against the enemies of the Islam. Enemies include 
non-Muslim states, but also current governments 
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of the Muslim countries who put their own lea-
dership ahead of God’s. De-radicalization, in that 
context, represents the process of rejection of this 
belief, in particular in the belief in legitimacy of 
violence over civilians, excommunication of tho-
se Muslims who do not share extremist views and 
the opposition to the concepts of democracy, civic 
liberties and human rights [10].
Similar to other Western Balkan countries, 
Serbia has also experienced the trend of the incre-
asing radicalization of the local Muslims. One of 
the manifestations of that phenomenon is a relati-
vely high number of the volunteers from the Bal-
kans in the war in Syria, fi ghting on the rebel side 
of the confl ict, mainly in those units considered 
to be close to the extremist and terrorist groups. 
Several Serbian citizens, from Novi Pazar, Sjenica 
and Tutin, were killed in the confl ict.  
Al-Qaeda members and associates in the We-
stern Balkans are oft en called the “White Al-Qae-
da” [11].  Al-Qaeda members and ISIL volunteers 
are recruited from the ultra-conservative Salafi st 
or Wahhabi Muslims. Estimated percentage of 
adherents to this subvariant of Sunni Islam in the 
Western Balkan region is varied: from 3% in Koso-
vo, 5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to almost 18% 
in the Sandžak region. Th e activities of Wahha-
bists receive tacit approval, and even protection, 
of some religious and political leaders of Balkan 
Muslims, which has a positive impact on their 
numbers. As a fundamentalist movement within 
the Sunni Islam, Wahhabism preaches the return 
to the primaeval Islam, which, in their opinion, 
existed during the time of Muhammad and his 
fi rst adherents, simultaneously considering all la-
ter forms and law schools of Islam as renegades. 
Wahhabis show open animosity towards the Ha-
nafi  school of Islam (prevalent in the Balkan Pe-
ninsula) as well as towards Sufi  orders (Alevi, Bek-
tashi etc), Shia Muslims, liberal Muslim thinkers 
and all non-muslims [12]. 
Certainly, Wahhabis should not be equalized 
with terrorists, however, in the Balkan region 
Wahhabism is the main catalyst for the radica-
lization of local Muslim population.  Wahhabi-
sm appeared in the Western Balkans during the 
eighties, when the fi rst students returned from the 
religious educational institutions of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Th eir number signifi cantly increased 
during and aft er the war in Bosnia, due to the ever 
more present foreign volunteers and missionaries 
whose activities were mostly funded by the state 
and non-governmental organizations of the Gulf 
countries, located in Bosnia, Sandžak and Kosovo. 
Islamic theologian from Sandžak, Sami Dže-
ko, in his polemic work “Wahhabism – the most 
dangerous novelty” points to the dimensions of 
this problem in the region: „Since the fi rst day 
when the Ottoman foot stepped on the Sandžak 
and Bosnian soil we followed the Hanafi  Madhhab 
and Maturidi aqida. (…) However, several ye-
ars ago a new movement arrived to our region. 
Wahhabis came and started preaching something 
opposite from what we believed in for centuries. 
(…) Th eir ideas were steadily disseminated among 
our people. Th eir call to the rejection of science, 
of traditional and well-known Hanafi  scholars 
and everything else that is not Wahhabi soon bore 
fruit. (…) Whoever polemicized with that sort of 
people had an opportunity to be ignored before he 
said anything, before he explained any proposition 
or before he tried to prove anything. Th e reason to 
such behavior lays in the psychology of adherents 
of any movement, especially religious sects, who 
always claim that everyone but them is wrong. 
Th erefore, as soon as he disagrees with their atti-
tude, their interlocutor will be characterized as a 
sinner or a kafi r. (…) Brutality and violence are 
commonplace in their missionary work. Such ca-
ses oft en occur worldwide, in particular in places 
where they have just arrived“ [13].
According to the media reports, the recrui-
tment of the Bosniaks for the war in Syria is or-
ganized by the leader of the Wahhabi community 
in the village of Gornja Maoča in the northern 
Bosnia, Nusret Imamović, as well as by Dževad 
Gološ, the owner of the Daru-l-Qur’an foundati-
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on for the Kur’an studies from Mostar. Wahhabis 
have also established a foothold in Sandžak, the 
region straddling the Serbia-Montenegro border. 
Furthermore, the division within the Muslim 
community in Serbia, and the rivalry between 
the Islamic Community of Serbia, with the seat in 
Belgrade, and the Islamic Community in Serbia, 
with the seat in Novi Pazar, additionaly contribu-
ted to the popularity of the radical Islam. Th e radi-
cal groups are present in the fi nancial (for instan-
ce, BBI Bank), educational (e.g. Elche Madrasa in 
Travnik), and non-profi t sector (charity organiza-
tions – Insan Haq Huriyyet, BIF, Furqan-e-Taibah 
International) [16].  Various Al-Qaeda associated 
organizations are active in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Serbia (Sandžak region), Macedonia and Ko-
sovo*, whilst the presence of Al-Qaeda-connected 
individuals was documented even in Croatia and 
Slovenia. Several incidents and prevented terrorist 
plots confi rm that the terrorist threat is not purely 
theoretical. 
Wahhabis are disproportionately represented 
amongst foreign volunteers, and according to the 
media estimates, around three hundred volunteers 
from the region joined the Syrian rebels, mainly 
the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda associates. Accor-
ding to Th omas Hegghamer “foreign fi ghters 
strengthen transnational terrorist groups as volun-
teering for war is a stepping-stone for individual 
involvement in the extreme forms of militancy. 
Majority of Al-Qaeda operatives started their ca-
reers as volunteers in war zones, and the majority 
of transnational jihadist groups today is a by-pro-
duct of the mobilization of foreign fi ghters” [15].
Most volunteers have been recruited through 
personal networks and contacts [17]. Also, a si-
gnifi cant number of persons was radicalized and 
recruited via Internet and social networks, using 
the jihadi narrative. Voluntary “draft ” to jihad 
can hardly be considered a novelty, but it reached 
new heights with the war in Syria. According to 
Hegghammer, during the last decade of the XX 
century in Europe only about one thousand volun-
teers left  to participate in the jihad, out of which, 
roughly, one half ended up in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, whilst in the fi rst decade of the new centu-
ry that number fell to 500 [15]. In 2012, according 
to more conservative estimates, the number of fo-
reign volunteers in Syria was around 2000, which 
represented slightly less than 10% of the rebel 
forces. Most of the foreign fi ghters came from the 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula, but neither the 
number of the fi ghters from Europe and the ex-
USSR is negligible [18].  Th e number and the per-
centage of the foreign fi ghters in the war in Syria 
increased in 2014 (12.000) and 2015 (25.000), but 
stagnated in 2016. It is estimated that around 5000 
foreign fi ghters come from the EU, and betwe-
en 500 and 1000 from the Western Balkans [19, 
20]. An average foreign fi ghter is 24 years old and 
about one third of the volunteers were brought up 
in families in which Wahhabi Islam is practiced. 
Fighters from the Western Balkans show similar 
demographic characterics with the diff erence of 
being somewhat older (26-39 years) [20].
Although arguably this number is not too 
high, it is still much higher than the number of 
the jihadists that decided to practically implement 
their ideas in their own countries. According to 
one hypothesis, militant jihadists prefer armed 
struggle in the war zones abroad, as they deem it 
to be more legitimate than the attacks in the pea-
ceful surroundings in the West. Th e reason for it 
is that in the war zones, the targets are other com-
batants, whereas the victims in the West would be 
mainly comprised of civilians. Certainly, there are 
those clerics who justify even the slaughter of civi-
lians in terrorist attacks, but their number is signi-
fi cantly lower in comparison to those who justify 
voluntary departure to war.  
On the frontlines volunteers undergo deeper 
radicalization. Th erefore, the risk of them com-
mitting terrorist acts once they return is increa-
sing. Th e share of the returnees is around 1/9 of 
the departed, and the experience of fi ghting on the 
Middle Eastern fronts is actually one of the main 
predictors of terrorist activity. According to some 
fi eld research data, even though only 26% of all 
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plotters had foreign fi ghter experience, around 
46% of all plots included at least one veteran. For 
executed attacks, the rate is 58%, and for executed 
attacks with fatalities, it is 67% [15].  Th is is further 
corroborated by Sageman [20], which leads us to 
a conclusion that the “foreign fi ghter eff ect” needs 
to be taken very seriously in estimating terrorism 
risk.  
4.  A POTENTIAL DYNAMICS 
BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND 
RETURNEES   
Centers for Asylum Seekers exist in some 
communities where there has been an increase in 
the activity of radical Islamists, and from where 
some volunteers departed to Syria. Th ese are the 
centers in the Sandžak Region - Sjenica and Tutin, 
as well as the centers in the southern municipaliti-
es of Bujanovac and Preševo.
According to the information provided by the 
Commissariat for Refugees and Migrations of the 
Republic of Serbia (KIRS), around 8000 migrants 
and asylum seekers currently reside in the Serbi-
an centers, of which about one half are under the 
age of eighteen. Also, a large percentage represents 
men who travel alone. Th e curiosity is that over 
80% are migrants from Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, whilst the number of refugees from Syria is 
signifi cantly lower than during the previous years. 
According to the information obtained from an in-
terview with a representative of the humanitarian 
organization dealing with the support of asylum 
seekers, there are currently about 450 young men 
aged 16 to 30 in the Preševo center, 120 in Sjenica, 
80 in Bujanovac and only about 30 in Tutin.
Th e additional problem, according to sour-
ces from KIRS, is the fact that for migrants it is 
getting extremely diffi  cult to leave Serbia, taking 
into account the low quotas and security measures 
prescribed by the Republic of Hungary, so most of 
them will remain in Serbia for months and per-
haps even years. Such a situation causes dissatis-
faction and frustration among asylum seekers, 
mostly adolescents.
On the other hand, according to a research 
report by the BIRN (Balkan Investigative Report 
Network) of January 2016, a total of 50 citizens 
of Serbia participated in the war in Syria and Iraq 
between 2012 and 2016. Eight people died in com-
bat, while seven returned to Serbia [22]. So, while 
the number of returnees is small, they can serve as 
role models for the disgruntled and disappointed 
young men from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, So-
malia and other countries that fi nd themselves in 
the limbo of Serbian collective centers, with less 
and less hope they will soon reach their fi nal desti-
nation in Western Europe.
We should not forget the fact that one of the 
main causes for fl eeing the Middle Eastern coun-
tries is the experience of life in a society that ISIL, 
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other Islamist groups 
advocate for. Th e vast majority of refugees and 
migrants are bitterly opposed to fundamentalist 
trends in religion and politics in their countries of 
origin. Still, in their hopelessness, it is not diffi  cult 
to imagine that vulnerable young people could 
turn to  humanitarian organizations based in the 
Gulf States and visit the so-called “para mosques” 
(informal mosques without minarets and neither 
under the jurisdiction of the Islamic Community 
of Serbia, nor the Islamic Community in Serbia). 
Also, the theory of “sleepers” and “false migrants” 
inserted into migrant columns and centers, altho-
ugh still without strong evidence, is not comple-
tely refuted [22].
Also, according to Daniel Byman, “the poten-
tial threat is huge, but the real threat is far lower, 
taking into account the actions of the counter-
terrorism and intelligence apparatus and other 
factors” [23]. Namely, many volunteers were killed 
in fi ghting or in suicide bombings in Syria / Iraq; 
many of them never return, but switch to another 
battlefi eld they consider to be of signifi cance for 
the jihad; a certain number is disappointed with 
the real situation on the battlefi eld and goes thro-
ugh a kind of “deradicalization”, and many retur-
nees are likewise subject to the security measures 
of the security services [24].
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5.  CONCLUSION
Th e migrant crisis caused by the situation in 
the countries of the Middle East, particularly by 
the civil war in Syria, together with the activities 
of ISIS and other radical groups, and exacerbated 
by the opposing interests of the great powers, has 
become a serious security problem for Europe and 
a test of the fundamental principles underlying the 
European Union.
Th e Western Balkans countries, the scene of 
the currently allegedly closed “Balkan Route”, have 
found themselves in a diffi  cult situation for purely 
geographical reasons. Th ey certainly cannot infl u-
ence the causes of the problem, but they must live 
with its consequences as well as trying to mana-
ge them. In addition to numerous technical, hu-
manitarian, social, sanitary and other issues, the 
refugee wave carries a number of security threats 
and problems, among which it is especially worth 
emphasizing the presence of radicalized retur-
nees from the Syrian confl ict in the Middle East. 
If we are to believe in the estimates, there are not 
many of them, so in this sense the problem is not 
very serious. What can have more serious eff ects 
is their infl uence in the Muslim communities in 
the Western Balkans countries, and the potential 
for promoting extreme and radical ideas prima-
rily among the younger population. Th is is espe-
cially in the context of the latest complications of 
the security and political situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
Th e fi nal conclusion is that the security threat 
of the returnees should not be blown out of pro-
portion, but neither should it be taken lightly.  In 
any case, an increased vigilance of the security 
services, intensifi ed cooperation and information 
exchange between the security services in the regi-
on and with the EUROPOL, as well as the media, 
educational and other activities on the prevention 
and promotion of the authentic and traditional in-
terpretation of Islam is a must for all countries in 
the region.  
6. REFERENCES
1. Kešetović, Ž, and Ninković, V. (2016). Migrants and Local Extremists in South-Eastern Europe, in Čaleta, D & She-
mella, P (eds.) Comprehensive Approach to Counter-Radicalism and Extremism – Future Challenges for Counter 
Terrorism Process. Ljubljana, pp.101-114. 
2. Jenkins, B.M. (2014). When Jihadis Come Marching Home. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 41pp.
3. Zammit, A. (2014).  “List of Alleged Violent Plots in Europe Involving Syria Returnees” accessed 23 February 2017, 
URL: https://andrewzammit.org/2014/06/29/list-of-alleged-violent-plots-in-europe-involving-syria-returnees/.
4. Park, J. (2015). “Europe’s migration crisis”. CFR Backgrounders. Council of Foreign Relations, accessed 28 February 
2017, URL: http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874.
5. UNHCR (2011). Convention and Protocol relating to the status of the refugees.  
6. Edwards, A. (2015). “UNHCR viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – Which is right?”, accessed 5  February 2016, URL: 
http://www.unhcr.org/55df0e556.html.
7. Sengupta, S. (28 Aug. 2015). Migrant of refugee? Th ere is a diff erence, with legal implications. Th e New York Times, 
accessed 5. February 2017, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/world/migrants-refugees-europe-syria.
html?_r=0
8. Tatalović, S. and Malnar, D. (2015). Sigurnosni aspekti izbjegličke krize. Političke analize, 6 (3): 23-29.
9. Schmid, A. (2011). Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and Concepts Relating to Terrorism and Counter Terrori-
sm. In Alex P. Schmid (Ed.), Th e Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London: Routledge,  678-679.
10. Vidino, L. (2011). Radicalisation, Linkage and Diversity, Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe. Santa Monica: 
RAND.
11. Trifunovic, D. (2009). Al-Qaeda’s Global Network and its Infl  uence on Western Balkans Nations. Circunstancia. 
Año VII - Nº 18. Fundacion José Ortega y Gasset.
MIGRANTS, LOCAL FUNDAMENTALISTS AND RETURNEES ALONG THE WESTERN BALKANS ROUTE
26
12. Deliso, C. (2007). Th e Coming Balkan Caliphate: Th e Th reat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Publishing Group.
13. Džeko, S. (2009). Vehabizam, najopasnija novotarija. Sjenica, 284 pp.
14. Krueger, A.B. (2006). Th e National Origins of Foreign Fighters in Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
15. Heghammer, T. (2013). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between 
Domestic and Foreign Fighting. American Political Science Review.
16. Trifunović, D. and Kešetović, Ž. (2014). Terrorism in the Western Balkans: Between Transition and Radicalism.
17. Reynolds, S. and Hafez, M. (2017).  Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Journal 
of Terrorism and Political Violence. Routledge. 
18. Lund, A. (2012). “Syrian Jihadism.Swedish Institute of International Aff airs”, accessed 27 February 2017, URL: http://
www.ui.se/upl/fi les/77409.pdf.
19. Koutsoliakos, V. and Flintisis, A. (2016). Refugees, Smugglers and Terrorists. Per Concordiam – Journal of European 
Security and Defense Issues, 7:3. 
20. Spahiu, E. (2015). Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State. Jamestown Terrorism Monitor. 13:10, 
accessed 27 February 2017, URL: https://jamestown.org/program/ethnic-albanian-foreign-fi ghters-and-the-islamic-
state/.
21.  Sageman, M. (.2008). Th e Next Generation of Terror. Foreign Policy, accessed 28 February 2017, URL: http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/02/19/the_next_generation_of_terror.
22. Ristić, M, Maksimović, Z and Dragojlo, S. (2016). Jihadists Target Young, Marginalized Serbian Muslims, in Bal-
kan Jihadists – Th e Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network. 
23. Byman, D. (2016). Th e Jihadist Returnee Th reat – Just How Dangerous? Political Science Quarterly, 131 (1): 69-99. 
24. Byman, D. and Shapiro, J. (2014). Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid – Th e Th reat of Terrorism from Western Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Brookings Institution.
 
POVRATNICI NA BALKANSKOJ RUTI - MIGRANTI I LOKALNI 
FUNDAMENTALISTI U REPUBLICI SRBIJI
Sažetak
Zajedno sa Republikom Makedonijom i Republikom Hrvatskom, Republika Srbija je locirana na Zapadnobalkanskoj mi-
grantskoj ruti te se stoga suočava sa velikim priljevom izbjeglica i ekonomskih migranata s Bliskog Istoka, Pakistana i Afga-
nistana od 2011. godine, a posebice od 2015. godine. Zapadni Balkan nije njihova destinacija, već tranzitna točka na putu 
prema Zapadnoj Europi. Unatoč tome, Srbija se,kao i druge zemlje na Zapadno Balkanskoj ruti, suočava sa čitavim nizom 
sigurnosnih rizika uzrokovanih izbjegličkom krizom. Jedna od najznačajnijih prijetnji je potencijal za sinergiju ekstremista koji 
kao lažni migranti idu na Zapad i lokalnih islamskih fundamentalista. Situaciju pogoršava sve veći broj povratnika dragovoljaca 
koji se vraćaju iz rata u Siriji, od kojih su mnogi ranije bili radikalizirani u lokalnim džamijama ili putem interneta. Sumnja se 
da oni održavaju vezu sa svojom „braćom po oružju“ i predstavljaju uzor/model za mlade ljude. Kako je najveći broj povratnika 
iz Sandžaka u jugozapadnom dijelu Srbije, problem može nastati u dva velika kampa za azilante koji se nalaze u toj regiji (Tutin 
i Sjenica).
Ključne riječi: migranti, migrantska kriza, povratnici, fundamentalizam.
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